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Abstract 
The United States largely relies on a system of arbitration to handle retail 
consumer financial disputes.  This approach has undergone significant challenge in 
recent years particularly in light of recent abuses of consumer credit arbitration 
mechanisms.  
This paper reports on the results of a non-randomized small-n survey which 
we label the “Financial Dispute Study” aimed at evaluating the relative effectiveness 
of two major approaches to financial dispute resolution – arbitration and ombuds 
services. Nearly a hundred survey questionnaires were distributed to financial dispute 
resolution practitioners throughout the world.  A total of forty-eight arbitrators and 
ombuds people from East Asia, North America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa 
responded. In the Study participants were asked how practitioners viewed the level of 
satisfaction, settlement rate and perceived increase or decrease in the use of the given 
method of financial dispute resolution – whether arbitration or ombuds service. This 
paper analyzes the method-effect, meaning we focus on the effect of the selected 
method of financial dispute resolution (whether ombuds or arbitration) on settlement, 
satisfaction and increase or decrease in use.  In doing so, the study evaluates the 
relative effectiveness of two major approaches a financial dispute resolution 
mechanism might adopt. 
We find no statistically significant evidence that a given method, arbitration or 
the use of ombuds process has a large (or any) effect on the settlement rate, level of 
satisfaction and usage.  To the contrary, arbitration and ombuds group point estimates 
are generally close to one another.  Nevertheless, the data indicate slightly higher 
levels of settlement and overall increase in use in ombuds processes worldwide.  
These findings, combined with feedback from open ended interviews along with 
structural safeguards against repeat-player advantage integrated into the ombuds 
process ensuring that awards are rendered without prejudice to the claimant, suggest 
that merit may be found in exploring the potential applications and use of ombuds 
processes for the resolution of US consumer financial disputes. The paper concludes 
with some limited interpretation of the results.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The United States largely relies on a system of arbitration to handle retail 
consumer financial disputes.  This approach has undergone significant challenge in 
recent years particularly in light of recent abuses of consumer credit arbitration 
mechanisms.  The global reach of the financial crisis calls for renewed investigation 
of how governments and self-regulatory organisations in major financial centres can 
effectively employ responsive dispute resolution mechanisms to address citizen 
complaints arising from financial dislocation.  Such an examination is important not 
only to help us understand the dynamics of resolving complex consumer disputes in 
times of financial crisis, but also to prepare us to apply lessons learned to the design 
of more robust, fair and efficient centres for the prevention and resolution of future 
financial disputes. 
 
Survey 
 
In order to assess how arbitrators and ombudsmen view the benefits, 
challenges and suggestions for the improvement of both ombuds and arbitration 
processes, a survey was conducted between the Fall of 2011 and the Summer of 2012.  
Nearly a hundred survey questionnaires were distributed to practitioners throughout 
the world.  A total of forty-eight arbitrators and ombuds people from East Asia, North 
America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa responded. The participants represented 
highly experienced practitioners, members of government regulatory ombuds services 
and private arbitration commissions. The majority of those surveyed (44 per cent) had 
worked for institutions involved in consumer financial dispute resolution for more 
than four years. 
 
Survey Design 
 
The survey used in this study contained a quantitative part asking for yes-no 
answers and numerical responses in the form of percentage estimates or evaluations 
according to four and five-point scales.   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2107714
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The first part of the survey asked participants background information on their 
years of experience, region of practice and primary method of resolving consumer 
financial disputes (i.e. arbitration, ombuds process or multi-tier process including the 
use of negotiation and mediation).  The second part examined participants’ 
observations regarding what they see as the benefits, challenges and areas for 
improvement in the resolution of consumer financial disputes using either arbitration 
or ombuds methods of resolution.  
 
Sample Pool and Distribution 
 
The sample pool consisted of ombuds people, arbitrators, mediators and 
members of consumer financial regulatory bodies.  The sample group was selected 
from contacts made with members of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, ADR 
Resources Group, the Association for International Arbitration, the Commercial and 
Industry Arbitration and Mediation Group, the Commercial Dispute Resolution 
Group, CPR Institute, International Arbitration Group, the Ombuds Group, Resolution 
Systems Institute and participants at the Asia Pacific Mediation Forum in 2011.   
Close to a hundred surveys were distributed to arbitrators, ombuds people and 
dispute resolution practitioners and a total of forty-eight individuals responded.  The 
questions were distributed at ADR conferences in East Asia, on-line through an web-
based survey collection site, and in person with members of arbitration centres in 
Shenzhen, Hong Kong, Macau, the United States and Europe. 
Figure 1: Survey Participants 
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The summary of the findings are as follows: practitioners of consumer 
financial dispute resolution view ombuds processes as particularly useful in providing 
an independent and free review service for financial customers.  At the same time the 
service also helps to identify areas of improvement and reform for banks.1 Perhaps as 
a result of such benefits, the use of ombuds processes has been increasing in recent 
years. The majority of respondents (89 per cent) indicated that they had in fact seen 
an increase in the use of ombuds processes in consumer financial dispute resolution in 
recent years. At the same time, practitioners acknowledged areas for continued 
improvement including the need for greater public education,2 oversight and quality 
assurance of ombuds processes.3  
The summary of the findings in relation to the arbitration process are as 
follows: Arbitration practitioners viewed the benefits of arbitration services in 
consumer financial disputes as providing disputants with technical expertise ‘where 
the parties are not arguing over the law, but application of financial/accounting 
principles.’ 4 In addition, respondents noted the ‘speed, reduced expense and expertise 
of the neutral.’ Among the challenges include ‘proof issues, imbalance of power and 
                                                
1 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
2 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
3 Survey No. 4 (July 2011–March 2012). 
4 Survey No. 8 (July 2011–March 2012). 
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information and lack of full discovery options/rights’.5  Concerns about such 
disparities were echoed by other participants who noted the prevalence of perceptions 
that ‘large institutions have “repeat-user” advantage’.6  Practitioners noted 
suggestions for improvement including the need for ‘[g]ood program design 
[including] exit evaluations [and a] grievance process to allow parties to file 
complaints against neutrals who do not perform well’.  In addition, ‘a code of ethics 
for neutrals’ was suggested along with ‘anything that supports procedural due 
process’.7  
 
 
2. Background - Financial Dispute Resolution in the United States 
 
In the United States, several major programs exist for the resolution of 
consumer financial disputes.8  These include both private arbitration and court-
annexed programs for credit card and bank loan complaints.  Among the most 
prominent nationwide programs in the area of investment disputes is the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’).  What characterises most consumer dispute 
resolution programs in the United States is a common concern for efficiency and 
finality.  However, such goals are increasingly being examined in the larger context of 
principles of equity and transparency as limited opportunities exist for court oversight 
and no general right of appeal exists on the part of the complainant to pursue claims 
in court (as in the ombuds model) if the complainant is not satisfied with the final 
award. 
 
The American Arbitration Association 
 
Among the more prominent alternative financial dispute resolution scheme, 
the American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’) provides a special set of rules for 
financial disputes: the AAA Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial Disputes, 
which are applicable to all disputes relating to commercial financial arrangements, 
                                                
5 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
6 Survey No. 14 (July 2011–March 2012). 
7 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
8 For comparative elaboration, see: Ali, S., Consumer Financial Dispute Resolution in a Comparative 
Context: Principles, Systems and Practice, Cambridge University Press (Forthcoming). 
 6 
products, or other matters, or conduct relating thereto9. This would including credit 
card and bank loan disputes.  To meet the financial sector's interest in speedy 
proceedings, the Rules provide a limited period for arbitration proceedings with a 
maximum time frame of 120 days10. For disputes where only a small amount of 
money is involved (up to US$75,000), an expedited procedure applies11, according to 
which a sole arbitrator will decide the dispute, preferably after only one day of 
hearing. If a second hearing is necessary, the rules provide that it shall take place 
within seven days of the first hearing. The award has to be rendered within thirty days 
of the conclusion of the hearing12. 
                                                
9 See r. 1 of the AAA Arbitration Rules for Commercial Financial Disputes: 
‘The parties to a dispute involving any commercial financial arrangement, product or other 
matter or conduct relating thereto, shall be deemed to have made these rules a part of their 
arbitration agreement whenever they have provided for arbitration by the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) or under its Commercial Financial Disputes Arbitration 
Rules.’ 
10 See r. 1, ibid: 
‘Consistent with the expedited nature of arbitration, the parties shall make every effort in good 
faith to conclude the arbitration within 120 days of its commencement.’ 
11 See r. 9, ibid: 
‘Unless the AAA in its discretion determines otherwise or the parties agree otherwise, the 
Expedited Procedures shall be applied in any case where no disclosed claim or counterclaim 
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and arbitration costs.’ 
12 S. Kratsch, ‘The financial crisis: arbitration as a viable option for European financial institutions’, 
Arbitration, 76(4) 2010, pp. 680–685. 
For details of the expedited procedures, see rr. 51–55, ibid: 
‘51. Notice by Telephone 
The parties shall accept all notices from the AAA by telephone. Such notices by the AAA 
shall subsequently be confirmed in writing to the parties. Should there be a failure to confirm 
in writing any notice hereunder, the proceeding shall nonetheless be valid if notice has, in fact, 
been given by telephone. 
52. Appointment and Qualification of Arbitrator 
(a) Where no disclosed claim or counterclaim exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and 
arbitration costs, the AAA shall appoint a single arbitrator, from the National Roster, without 
submission of lists of proposed arbitrators. 
(b) Where all parties request that a list of proposed arbitrators be sent, the AAA shall submit 
simultaneously to each party an identical list of five proposed arbitrators, drawn from the 
National Roster of Arbitrators, from which one arbitrator shall be appointed. Each party may 
strike two names from the list on a peremptory basis. The list is returnable to the AAA within 
seven days from the date of the AAA's mailing to the parties. 
If for any reason the appointment of an arbitrator cannot be made from the list, the AAA may 
make the appointment from among other members of the National Roster without the 
submission of additional lists. 
(c) The parties will be given notice by telephone by the AAA of the appointment of the 
arbitrator, who shall be subject to disqualification for the reasons specified in Section 17. 
Within seven days, the parties shall notify the AAA, by telephone, of any objection to the 
arbitrator appointed. Any objection by a party to the arbitrator shall be confirmed in writing to 
the AAA with a copy to the other party or parties. 
53. Date, Time and Place of Hearing 
The arbitrator shall set the date, time and place of the hearing. The AAA will notify the parties 
by telephone, at least seven days in advance of the hearing date. A formal notice of hearing 
will also be sent by the AAA to the parties. 
54. The Hearing 
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 However, in a Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration pilot programme 
in 2000, in which investors were offered the option to file with JAMS or the AAA, 
investors selected the SRO’s arbitration forum (such as FINRA) over non-SRO 
forums’ higher fees and investors’ ‘general degree of comfort with existing and more 
familiar SRO procedures.’13 
 
Challenges and Shortcomings of Mandatory Consumer Credit Card Arbitration 
 
 Mandatory consumer credit card arbitration forums in the United States have 
been the focus of public litigation in recent years regarding alleged ties to credit card 
and collection industries.  A recent consent decree issued in 2009 between Minnesota 
Attorney General Lori Swanson and the National Arbitration Forum (‘Forum’) – the 
country’s largest administrator of credit card and consumer collections arbitrations, 
brought to light serious systemic issues including lack of impartiality and 
independence on the part of the National Arbitration Forum.  It was found that the 
National Arbitration Forum ‘worked alongside credit card companies to get them to 
put unfair arbitration clauses in the fine print of their contracts and to appoint the 
Forum as the arbitrator.’14  
The Forum, which was named as the arbitrator of consumer disputes in tens of 
millions of credit card agreements, according to the suit, allegedly hid from the public 
its extensive ties to the collection industry.15   The lawsuit alleged that the Forum 
worked behind the scenes to convince credit card companies and other creditors to 
insert arbitration provisions in their customer agreements and then appointed the 
Forum to decide the disputes.  It also alleged that the company arbitrated 214,000 
consumer arbitration claims in 2006, nearly 60 per cent of which were filed by laws 
firms with which the Forum was linked through ties to a New York hedge fund. 16 
                                                                                                                                      
Generally, the hearing shall be completed within one day, unless the dispute is resolved by 
submission of documents under Section 35. The arbitrator, for good cause shown, may 
schedule an additional hearing to be held within seven days. 
55. Time of Award 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the award shall be rendered not later than 30 days 
from the date of the closing of the hearing.’ 
13 Little, ‘Fairness is in the eyes of the beholder’, Baylor L. Rev., 60 (2008), p. 73. 
14 See: D. Gupta, ‘Consent Decree in Minnesota v. NAF’, Consumer Law & Policy Blog, 20 July 2009, 
available at: http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2009/07/consent-decree-in-minnesota-v-naf.html 
[accessed 26 April 2012]. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid. 
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According to the terms of the settlement, the National Arbitration Forum 
agreed to stop accepting any new consumer arbitrations or in any manner participate 
in the processing or administering of new consumer arbitrations. The company will 
permanently stop administering arbitrations involving consumer debt, including credit 
cards, consumer loans, telecommunications, utilities, health care, and consumer 
leases. 17 
 Such suits have brought to light the potential inequities existing behind the 
fine print of consumer agreements including mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
and have sparked United States Congressional interest and investigation. 18 
 
Financial Dispute Resolution through FINRA  
 
 In order to understand the role and function of the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’), the most prominent nationwide program for the 
arbitration of consumer disputes with broker-dealers and financial institutions, it is 
necessary to examine its legislative and regulatory background.   
 
Arbitration of Securities Disputes - Securities Act 1933   
 
The Securities Act of 1933 was the first major piece of federal legislation 
governing securities.  It combined a full disclosure scheme with antifraud provisions 
and the end product was federal statutory requirement to file a registration statement 
(prospectus) with Federal Trade Commission, imposing civil and criminal liabilities 
for failure to comply19. 
 Although this created government and self-regulatory oversight, the general 
philosophy of the regulation of the sale of securities is ‘buyer-beware’, with Federal 
and state laws requiring that investors receive material information concerning 
securities being offered for public sale, and prohibit deceit, misrepresentation and 
other fraud20.   
                                                
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 C. W. Cole, ‘Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): is the consolidation of NASD and 
the regulatory arm of NYSE a bull or a bear for U.S. capital markets?’, UMKC L. Rev., 76 (2007–
2008), pp. 251–272.  
20 Powell, ‘Business law: what Montana lawyers need to know about FINRA’, Montana Lawyer, 33 
(2008), p. 31. 
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Securities Exchange Act 1934   
 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the Securities Exchange 
Commission (‘SEC’) to regulate and enforce securities markets.  It also contained 
disclosure provisions for those who buy and sell securities in the secondary market 
rather than the company’s initial offerings, and creates remedies for fraud in trading 
and manipulating secondary markets21. The Act also requires stock exchanges to 
register with the SEC22. 
 The Maloney Act 1938 was an amendment to the 1934 Act, and requires 
registration by national securities associations of over-the-counter (‘OTC’) brokers 
and dealers with the SEC.  The National Association of Securities Dealers (‘NASD’) 
was the only association to register23. The SEC was created by the 1934 Act and has 
broad regulatory authority to oversee the securities industry24. 
 
Self-Regulatory Organisations- FINRA  
 
Self-regulatory organisations (‘SROs’) are defined a non-governmental enties 
responsible for regulating its members through the adoption and enforcement of rules 
and regulations governing the business conduct of its members25. 
 Securities industry self-regulatory organisations began as private sector 
membership organisations of securities industry professionals. They set standards of 
conduct for their members and disciplined errant members. Securities industry SROs 
existed before the federal securities laws were enacted in 1933 and 1934, and 
important concepts of federal law were taken from SRO regulation and became an 
added layer of regulation on top of SRO regulation. Over the last seventy-five years, 
SROs have grown in membership and become more powerful organisations, but they 
also have become integrated into the scheme of federal statutory regulation, and now 
operate subject to SEC oversight of all of their activities. Moreover, as SROs have 
proliferated, some new SROs have been created by amendments to the securities 
                                                
21 C. W. Cole, ‘Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): is the consolidation of NASD and 
the regulatory arm of NYSE a bull or a bear for U.S. capital markets?’. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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laws. They are thus a peculiar mix of private sector self-regulation and delegated 
governmental regulation26. 
 
National Association of Securities Dealers   
 
The National Association of Securities Dealers was formed in 1939 in 
response to the Maloney Act of 1938, which permitted a national association of 
securities brokers and dealers to self-regulate over-the-counter markets.  It developed 
the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (‘NASDAQ’) in 
1971, which operates and has improved the quality and organisation of the OTC 
securities market, becoming the second largest stock market in the United States.  
NASD licensed over 665,000 individuals and oversaw 5,100 firms with over 170,000 
branch offices, and set rules for firm and representative behaviour as well as 
disciplined firms and individuals who do not comply with NASD rules or SEC 
regulations27. 
 In 1994, the Rudman Committee was formed to review NASDAQ governance 
and operations, and concluded NASD and NASDAQ should separate to some degree, 
leading to NASD to sell the NASDAQ stock market in 2000 – NASD remains 
regulator of NADAQ by contract, and is still the only national securities association 
to register with SEC, hence retaining regulatory jurisdiction over any security not 
traded on an exchange28. 
 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority   
 
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’) on its face, is simply 
a consolidation of NASD and the enforcement and arbitration functions of NYSE 
Regulation.  Although it combines the regulatory functions of an exchange with a 
securities association, many of the different provisions concerning stock exchanges 
and securities associations in the 1934 Act are similar, and it is thus feasible for one 
organisation to carry out the duties of both29. 
                                                
26 Karmel, ‘Should securities industry self-regulatory organizations be considered government 
agencies?’ Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin., 14 (2008), p. 151. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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 The stated purpose for the consolidation of the NASD and NYSE’s regulatory 
arm is to bring more efficiency to securities industry regulatory efforts by creating a 
single rule book for broker-dealers. FINRA was designed as a monopoly SRO under 
the active and direct oversight of the SEC.  Although FINRA may not be a 
government entity, in all or virtually all of its activities, it can be viewed as exercising 
powers delegated to it by the SEC30. 
 
Federal Arbitration Act  
 
The Federal Arbitration Act was passed by Congress in 1925, requiring courts 
to ‘enforce arbitration agreements in the same manner as other contracts’31. 
 Section 2 of the Act32 declares irrevocable and enforceable written arbitration 
provisions in all maritime transactions and contracts ‘involving commerce’33. 
 
Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427 (1953) 
 
In the case of Wilko v. Swan the Supreme Court held that a pre-dispute 
agreement to arbitrate a claim under the Securities Act 1933 as being unenforceable 
for public policy reasons notwithstanding the existence of the Federal Arbitration Act.  
The Court felt that since there were risks that arbitrators would misapply law, which 
the judiciary would not be able to overturn under the Federal Arbitration Act, 
allowing securities arbitration would in effect allow claimants to waive provisions of 
the Securities Act34. 
 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 482 U.S. 220 (1987) 
                                                
30 Karmel, ‘Should securities industry self-regulatory organizations be considered government 
agencies?’. 
31 B. B. Zoltowski, ‘Restoring investor confidence: providing uniformity in securities arbitration by 
offering guidelines for arbitrators in deciding motions to dismiss before a hearing on the merits’, 
Syracuse L. Rev., 58(3) (2008), pp. 375–396. 
32 Section 2 of the Act states that:  
‘A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ 
33 J. I. Gross, ‘The end of mandatory securities arbitration?’, Pace L. Rev., 30 (2010), p. 1174. 
34 B. B. Zoltowski, ‘Restoring investor confidence: providing uniformity in securities arbitration by 
offering guidelines for arbitrators in deciding motions to dismiss before a hearing on the merits’. 
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In the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme 
Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were valid35. 
 The Court stated that Wilko v. Swan was decided under the Securities Act as 
opposed to the Exchange Act and that in any event Wilko v. Swan ‘must be read as 
barring waiver of a judicial forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect the 
substantive rights at issue.’  The Court interpreted the provision against waiver in the 
Securities Exchange Act to only prohibit waiver of substantive rights, whereas, 
agreements to arbitrate just waived jurisdiction.  Originally designed to provide ‘a 
fast, efficient and cost-effective means of resolving securities disputes,’ the SEC 
supported the Court's approval of securities arbitration agreements.  The SEC felt 
arbitration would provide a forum in which investors could resolve small claims that 
did not justify the expense of litigation36. 
 Since then, virtually all customers’ disputes with their broker-dealers and 
registered representatives are resolved through arbitration in the FINRA (or its 
predecessors NASD and NYSE) forum37. 
 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 477 (1989) 
 
The case of Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. was the 
Supreme Court case that expressly overruled Wilko v. Swan following 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon38. 
 Subsequent to the Shearson/American Express, Inc. v McMahon and 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. decisions, the number of 
SRO securities arbitrations substantially increased39. 
 
Arbitration Fairness Act 2009  
 
In recent years, academics, media commentators and consumer advocates have 
questioned the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 B. Black, ‘How to improve retail investor protection after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act’, U. Pa. J. Bus. L., 13 (2010), pp. 59–106. 
38 S. Kratsch, ‘The financial crisis: arbitration as a viable option for European financial institutions’.  
39 Little, ‘Fairness is in the eyes of the beholder’. 
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agreements, which result in class action waivers, inconvenient venue selection, cost-
shifting provisions, and process limitations being forced on parties with inferior 
bargaining power.  Courts usually enforce such clauses under the Federal Arbitration 
Act due to the Supreme Court’s mandate that courts ruling on arbitrability questions 
must apply a presumption of arbitrability.  Both the Senate and House introduced 
nearly identical bills to enact the Arbitration Fairness Act to reflect findings that the 
Federal Arbitration Act intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of 
similar sophistication and bargaining power, but Supreme Court decisions have 
changed the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act to extend to disputes between 
parties of disparate economic power.  Furthermore, most consumers and employees 
have little or no meaningful option regarding whether to submit their claims to 
arbitration – a process that many argue undermines the development of public law for 
civil and consumer rights as there is no meaningful judicial review of arbitrator’s 
decisions, and the process is not transparent40. 
 If passed by Congress, this Act would amend the Federal Arbitration Act to 
invalidate pre-dispute arbitration agreements requiring arbitration of employment, 
consumer, franchise and civil rights disputes.  The Senate version of the Arbitration 
Fairness Act expressly extends its coverage to securities industry disputes through the 
definition of consumer disputes.  However, Congress’ legislative agenda for 2010 has 
placed the Arbitration Fairness Act on the backburner and focused on financial 
services regulatory reform41. 
 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act  
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was a 
major reform bill that includes a provision that empowers the SEC to prohibit pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in customer agreements42. 
 Section 921 of the Act43 grants the SEC authority to limit or prohibit the use of 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements44. 
                                                
40 J. I. Gross, ‘The end of mandatory securities arbitration?’. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Section 921 of the Act provides that: 
“(a) Amendment to Securities Exchange Act of 1934- Section 15 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o), as amended by this title, is further amended by adding at the end 
the following new subsection: 
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FINRA Mandate and Function  
 
FINRA is now the largest non-governmental regulator for all securities firms 
doing business in the United States.  It overseas nearly 5,100 brokerage firms, 
173,000 branch offices and over 669,000 registered securities representatives45.  Its 
role includes market oversight46, salesperson regulation47, investor education, 
enforcement and arbitration. 
 
Investor Education, Enforcement and Arbitration  
 
FINRA provides public educational materials that give a general overview of the 
securities industry and other basic information on securities intended to be accessible 
to laypersons48. 
FINRA has authority to discipline licensed securities firms and registered 
individuals for breaches of rules and federal securities laws.  Jurisdiction works in 
                                                                                                                                      
‘(o) Authority to Restrict Mandatory Pre-dispute Arbitration- The Commission, by rule, may 
prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers 
or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute 
between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, 
or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of 
conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of investors.’. 
(b) Amendment to Investment Advisers Act of 1940- Section 205 of the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-5) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
‘(f) Authority to Restrict Mandatory Pre-dispute Arbitration- The Commission, by rule, may 
prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers 
or clients of any investment adviser to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under 
the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a self-
regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or 
limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of investors.’.” 
44 B. Black, ‘How to improve retail investor protection after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act’. 
45 Powell, ‘Business law: what Montana lawyers need to know about FINRA’. 
46 Ibid. FINRA oversees and regulates trading on a national level, including NASDAQ, the American 
Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange, the Chicago Climate Exchange in the OTC 
markets, as well as trades in NYSE and Amex-listed securities reported to NASDAQ.  It also regulates 
trading in the corporate bond markets. Corporate bond transactions are reported to FINRA's Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (‘TRACE’) and are disseminated to the public. 
 
47 Ibid. FINRA oversees background checks, examinations, licensing and oversight of licensed 
securities salespersons.  It also operates a central licensing and registration system for USA securities 
industry and regulators, contains the registration records of more than 6,800 registered broker-dealers 
and the qualification, employment, and disclosure histories of more than 660,000 active registered 
individuals (salespersons). 
 
48 Powell, ‘Business law: what Montana lawyers need to know about FINRA’. 
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coordination with the dual federal-state jurisdiction that gives authority to the SEC 
and the state regulators to regulate the members of the securities industry through 
administrative, civil and criminal filings49. 
The majority of contracts between salesperson, broker-dealer firms and 
customers include an arbitration requirement, and most contractual disputes go 
through an arbitration process.  Though there are several organisations that could 
handle securities arbitrations, the majority of security disputes are handled by FINRA 
according to its rules and regulations for arbitration50. 
Compulsory arbitration between member firms and member firms and their 
employees has generally been viewed as a matter of private contract, a condition of 
being a member of an SRO51. 
Even if a customer agreement does not contain a pre-dispute arbitration clause, 
the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes Rule 1220052 
requires broker-dealers to submit to arbitration at the demand of a customer53. 
 In addition to the more formal arbitration procedure, FINRA offers a 
nonbinding mediation program. During the period 2005–7, according to FINRA’s 
statistics, approximately 70–80 per cent of claims filed were settled or resolved 
through means other than an arbitrator decision, 3–4 per cent of cases were resolved 
by arbitrators on the basis of written submissions, and 18–20 per cent of cases were 
resolved after a formal hearing54. 
 
Underlying Legal Mandate 
 
The primary function of SROs is the regulation of broker-dealers, serving as 
intermediaries between the SEC and regulated members of the industry. A broker is 
                                                
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Karmel, ‘Should securities industry self-regulatory organizations be considered government 
agencies?’. 
52 Rule 12200 provides that: 
‘Parties must arbitrate a dispute under the Code if: 
•  Arbitration under the Code is either: 
(1) Required by a written agreement, or 
(2) Requested by the customer; 
•  The dispute is between a customer and a member or associated person of a member; and 
•  The dispute arises in connection with the business activities of the member or the associated 
person, except disputes involving the insurance business activities of a member that is also an 
insurance company.’ 
53 J. I. Gross, ‘The end of mandatory securities arbitration?’. 
54 S. Choi, J. E. Fisch and A. C. Pritchard, ‘Attorneys as arbitrators’, J. Legal Stud., 39 (2010), p. 109. 
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defined as ‘any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities 
for the account of others,’ and a dealer as ‘any person engaged in the business of 
buying and selling securities for such person's own account.’ Many firms operate as 
both brokers and dealers. The Securities Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to 
register with the SEC and join either a registered national securities exchange or an 
SRO55. 
 The authority granted to FINRA under the Exchange Act allows it to be an 
effective intermediary between the SEC and its registered broker-dealers. While the 
SEC does not have the general authority to adopt rules governing the conduct of 
registered broker-dealers in relation to their customers, FINRA, and other SROs like 
it, require their members to adopt rules of conduct and to retain the power to enforce 
these rules (and other supervisory policies and procedures) using designated 
enforcement and examination staff56. 
 
Types of Dispute 
 
Procedure  
 
FINRA administers ‘the largest [US] dispute resolution forum for investors 
and registered firms.’ FINRA Dispute Resolution (‘FINRADR’) provides both 
mediation and arbitration, and suggests, but does not require, that an aggrieved 
investor first attempt to resolve the conflict with the brokerage firm's management.  
The FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes applies to any 
dispute between a customer and a member that is submitted to arbitration57. 
 Once an investor is compelled to arbitrate a claim, the modern process is akin 
to litigation with only slight variation. Arbitration, despite being touted as a ‘quick, 
fair, and relatively inexpensive’ alternative to litigation, employs similarly formal 
procedures that can increase costs and cause delays.  First, the complainant files an 
initial statement of claim with the Director of Dispute Resolution, ‘specifying the 
relevant facts and remedies requested.’ The respondent then serves an answer 
                                                
55 J. T. Koebel, ‘Trust and the investment adviser industry: Congress’ failure to realize FINRA’s 
potential to restore investor confidence’, Seton Hall Legis. J., 35 (2010), p. 61. 
56 Ibid. 
57 C. Alpert, ‘Financial Services in the United States and United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to 
Securities Regulation and Dispute Resolution’, BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. Rev., 5 (2008), p. 75. 
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including relevant facts, available defences and any counterclaims. A panel, usually 
consisting of three arbitrators, is appointed to consider the initial statement of claim 
and all responsive pleadings. Similar to litigation, the parties are subject to a 
discovery process including depositions, motion hearings on disputed collateral 
matters, and possible sanctions for failure to comply with any of the FINRA Code 
requirements. The parties produce witnesses and the arbitrators have the authority to 
issue subpoenas where necessary to compel production of documents or persons to 
appear. Except in certain circumstances, parties present their evidence in the form of 
testimony and documents in a litigation-like hearing before the arbitral panel. Unlike 
litigation, however, evidence is admissible notwithstanding state or federal evidence 
rules, although witnesses must testify under oath or affirmation58.  
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rules establish two categories of 
arbitrators – public and non-public (industry). Under the current procedures, claims 
for less than US$25,000 are resolved through a simplified procedure involving a 
single arbitrator who resolves the case without a formal hearing. Claims for between 
US$25,000 and US$50,000 receive a hearing conducted by a single arbitrator, 
although any party has the right to request a three-person panel. If the claim is heard 
by a single arbitrator, FINRA rules require that the arbitrator be a public arbitrator 
unless the parties agree otherwise. Claims for US$50,000 or more are resolved by a 
panel consisting of three arbitrators. If the case is heard by a three-person panel, the 
rules provide that the panel will be composed of two public arbitrators and one non-
public (industry) arbitrator59. 
 Current and former professionals in the securities industry and other 
professionals with substantial industry ties may not be classified as public arbitrators 
(Uniform Code of Arbitration, FINRA Code r. 10308[a][5]60).  Public arbitrators are 
                                                
58 Ibid. 
59 S. Choi, J. E. Fisch and A. C. Pritchard, ‘Attorneys as arbitrators’. 
60 FINRA Rule 10308[a][5] states that: 
‘(5) “public arbitrator” 
(A) The term "public arbitrator" means a person who is otherwise qualified to serve as an 
arbitrator and: 
(i) is not engaged in the conduct or activities described in paragraphs (a)(4)(A) through (D); 
(ii) was not engaged in the conduct or activities described in paragraphs (a)(4)(A) through (D) 
for a total of 20 years or more; 
(iii) is not an investment adviser; 
(iv) is not an attorney, accountant, or other professional whose firm derived 10 percent or 
more of its annual revenue in the past 2 years from any persons or entities listed in paragraph 
(a)(4)(A); 
(v) is not employed by, and is not the spouse or an immediate family member of a person who 
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thus intended to be industry outsiders or ‘neutrals’. Non-public arbitrators, commonly 
known as industry arbitrators, include current and former brokers, bankers, and other 
securities professionals. The category also includes attorneys, accountants, and other 
professionals who have devoted 20 per cent or more of their professional work to 
industry clients (Uniform Code of Arbitration, FINRA Code r. 10308[a][4]61). 
 Arbitrators for FINRA arbitrations are chosen through a list selection system 
administered by the director of dispute resolution, termed the Neutral List Selection 
System (‘NLSS’).  The lists are generated by an NASD computer program using a 
rotational method, although the computer eliminates arbitrators with obvious conflicts 
of interest. Along with the lists, the parties are also provided with background 
information on each arbitrator, including a copy of that arbitrator's Arbitrator 
Disclosure Report. Parties are allowed to request additional information about the 
arbitrators62. 
                                                                                                                                      
is employed by, an entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, any partnership, corporation, or other organization that is engaged in 
the securities business; 
(vi) is not a director or officer of, and is not the spouse or an immediate family member of a 
person who is a director or officer of, an entity that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled 
by, or is under common control with, any partnership, corporation, or other organization that 
is engaged in the securities business; and 
(vii) is not the spouse or an immediate family member of a person who is engaged in the 
conduct or activities described in paragraphs (a)(4)(A) through (D). 
(B) For purposes of this Rule, the term "immediate family member" means: 
(i) a person's parent, stepparent, child, or stepchild; 
(ii) a member of a person's household; 
(iii) an individual to whom a person provides financial support of more than 50 percent of the 
individual's annual income; or 
(iv) a person who is claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes.’ 
61 FINRA Rule 10308[a][4] states that:  
‘(4) “non-public arbitrator” 
The term "non-public arbitrator" means a person who is otherwise qualified to serve as an 
arbitrator and: 
(A) is, or within the past 5 years, was: 
(i) associated with, including registered through, a broker or a dealer (including a government 
securities broker or dealer or a municipal securities dealer); 
(ii) registered under the Commodity Exchange Act; 
(iii) a member of a commodities exchange or a registered futures association; or 
(iv) associated with a person or firm registered under the Commodity Exchange Act; 
(B) is retired from, or spent a substantial part of a career, engaging in any of the business 
activities listed in subparagraph (4)(A); 
(C) is an attorney, accountant, or other professional who has devoted 20 percent or more of his 
or her professional work, in the last two years, to clients who are engaged in any of the 
business activities listed in subparagraph (4)(A); or 
(D) is an employee of a bank or other financial institution and effects transactions in 
securities, including government or municipal securities, and commodities futures or options 
or supervises or monitors the compliance with the securities and commodities laws of 
employees who engage in such activities.’ 
62 S. Choi, J. E. Fisch and A. C. Pritchard, ‘Attorneys as arbitrators’. 
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 The chair of the panel is typically responsible for the overall administration of 
the proceeding, including the resolution of discovery disputes, ruling on evidentiary 
issues, etc.  Parties have the right, in the first instance, to designate the chair of the 
panel by agreement, although, according to FINRA, the parties agree on the 
designation of the chair only 20 per cent of the time.  If the parties are unable to 
agree, the chair is appointed by the director and is to be the public arbitrator who 
received the highest combined ranking ‘as long as the person is not an attorney, 
accountant, or other professional who has devoted 50 [per cent] or more of his or her 
professional or business activities, within the last two years, to representing or 
advising public customers in matters relating to disputed securities or commodities 
transactions or similar matters’ (Uniform Code of Arbitration, FINRA Code, Rule 
10308[c][5][A]). 
 Unlike the United Kingdom or Australia, since FINRA complainants must pay 
an arbitration fee, a hearing deposit, and attorneys' fees, cost-deterrence serves as a 
filter, and therefore strict jurisdictional prerequisites for arbitration are unnecessary63. 
 
Awards  
 
If the parties proceed to an award, the FINRA Code requires that a majority of 
arbitrators agree on the rulings and determinations, but it does not require written 
opinions. ‘Awards are subject to judicial review on the merits’ only for ‘manifest 
disregard’ of the law and ‘do not serve as precedent’. 64 This limited judicial review 
and absence of a required reasoned opinion allows arbitrators to base awards in favour 
of claimants on ‘general equity grounds’. 65 
FINRA Arbitration has no statutory cap on the value of awards, but incorporates 
a small-claims procedure, by which it diverts claims for US$25,000 or less to a 
Simplified Arbitration Procedure. Unless the customer requests a hearing, such claims 
are decided solely on the parties' written submissions.66 
 
Fees 
                                                
63 C. Alpert, ‘Financial Services in the United States and United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to 
Securities Regulation and Dispute Resolution’. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
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 FINRADR is administered by FINRA, and is funded by regulatory fees from 
FINRA members, dispute resolution fees from users, as well as other fees from 
FINRA’s regulatory role. 
 
Oversight 
 
The SEC exercises oversight authority over FINRA as the SRO for broker-
dealers, which is the principal regulator67. 
 SROs set rules governing member firms in the financial industry and provide 
oversight, supplementing that of the SEC. 8 SROs report to the SEC, which subjects 
SRO rules to an approval process68. 
 The SEC provides little oversight over FINRA arbitration.  Little oversight by 
the SEC combined with the court's grant of nearly limitless power to arbitrators 
makes investor protection uncertain at best69. 
 
Strengths 
 
The advantage of securities arbitration from a retail investors’ perspective is 
that they may be able to recover damages despite the unavailability of a legal remedy, 
and emphasis of the FINRA arbitration forum on equity allows arbitrators to fashion a 
remedy for investors that may not be supported by the law70. 
 The pre-dispute arbitration agreement also provides reasonable notice, the 
right to retain counsel and to present evidence, a convenient geographical location for 
the evidentiary hearing, and the right to adequate relief.  Arbitration with FINRA 
generally allows the claimant to have the dispute resolved in a timelier manner than 
litigation.  Moreover, the statutes of limitations in many jurisdictions are substantially 
shorter than the NASD Customer Code's six-year eligibility rule – an investor claim 
                                                
67 B. Black, ‘How to improve retail investor protection after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act’. 
68 J. T. Koebel, ‘Trust and the investment adviser industry: Congress’ failure to realize FINRA’s 
potential to restore investor confidence’. 
69 B. B. Zoltowski, ‘Restoring investor confidence: providing uniformity in securities arbitration by 
offering guidelines for arbitrators in deciding motions to dismiss before a hearing on the merits’. 
70 B. Black, ‘How to improve retail investor protection after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act’. 
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filed in civil litigation might be more likely dismissed upon these grounds, whereas in 
arbitration the investor might have been awarded a substantial portion of his or her 
compensatory damages regardless of the statutes of limitations71. 
 FINRA Arbitration also offers finality benefits for either side when 
successful72. 
 
Challenges 
 
Harmonisation  
 
Following the merger of NASD and NYSE Regulation, there has been the 
challenge of how the rules of the two organisations should be merged and 
harmonised, raising the issue of whether FINRA should continue with rules-based 
regulation or move to a principle-based or tier-based approach73. 
 
Bank Broker-Dealers  
 
FINRA recently proposed to adopt a modified version of NASD Rule 2350, 
known as the ‘bank broker-dealer rule’.  The proposed rule change seeks to prevent 
FINRA member firms that offer broker-dealer products and services through 
contractual ‘networking arrangements’ with financial institutions – both on and off 
the premises of those institutions – from undertaking certain business practices that 
might tend to confuse or harm customers of financial institutions.  The proposed rule 
change also aims to prevent customer confusion by, inter alia, ensuring that certain 
disclosures are made to customers so they can understand and appreciate the 
distinction(s) between the products and services sold by a financial institution and 
those sold by its broker-dealer affiliate74. 
 The proposed rule change protects bank customers who may be solicited for 
the purchase of investment products and services, but only to a limited extent. It does 
                                                
71 Little, ‘Fairness is in the eyes of the beholder’.  
72 C. Alpert, ‘Financial Services in the United States and United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to 
Securities Regulation and Dispute Resolution’. 
73 C. W. Cole, ‘Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA): is the consolidation of NASD and 
the regulatory arm of NYSE a bull or a bear for U.S. capital markets?’. 
74 J. I. Gross and E. Pekarek, ‘Banks and brokers and bricks and clicks: an evaluation of FINRA’s 
proposal to modify the “bank broker-dealer rule”’, Alb. L. Rev., 73 (2010), p. 465. 
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not rectify sales practices of broker-dealers – affiliated with financial institutions – 
which tend to confuse, and even mislead, financially unsophisticated investors of 
modest means who can least afford to be exposed to excessive risk. 75 Additionally, 
the proposed rule change adds no meaningful surveillance, inspection, enforcement, 
or punitive mechanisms to prevent and/or redress insidious practices that are akin to 
‘bait and switch’ tactics and are particularly effective against financially 
unsophisticated investors. 76 In fact, the proposed rule change even rolls back some 
key regulatory provisions, an especially unsettling retreat when one considers the lack 
of oversight during the recent market malaise and the contribution that such 
abridgement may have made to the present economic contraction as a reverse ‘wealth 
effect’ impinges upon consumer behaviour.  It is arguable that the proposed rule 
change is inadequate to sufficiently protect investors and promote genuine market 
integrity77. 
 
Challenge to Mandatory Securities Arbitration   
 
As noted above, the passage of the Arbitration Fairness Act would extend to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the securities industry.  Furthermore, the SEC has 
now been empowered to prohibit such clauses in customer agreements.   
Investor advocates argue securities arbitration is unfair, inefficient, expensive 
and biased towards the securities industry, whilst the securities industry argues the 
process works well, is faster and less expensive than litigation, and is fair to all parties 
involved78. 
It has been argued that because securities arbitration differs from other forms of 
consumer arbitration, the power of the SEC should not be exercised and the 
Arbitration Fairness Act should not be extended to the securities industry.  In this 
regard, it has been pointed out that the SEC robustly exercises its authority to oversee 
FINRA, including its dispute resolution arm, while no administrative agency reviews 
consumer or non-securities employment arbitration forums.  FINRA Conduct Rule 
3110(f) prescribes language that member firms must include in their customer 
agreements, and precludes brokerage firms from including unfair provisions, or 
                                                
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 J. I. Gross, ‘The end of mandatory securities arbitration?’. 
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provisions that limit a customer’s rights and remedies.  FINRA bars brokerage firms 
from imposing class action waivers, and FINRA Dispute Resolution does not permit 
class arbitrations, thus freeing investors to pursue class action claims in court.  
FINRA's Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes contains provisions 
that expressly contradict the types of unfair consumer arbitration provisions that the 
Arbitration Fairness Act targets, and FINRA actively facilitates forum access by 
subsidising forum fees and reducing costs to lower levels than consumer arbitration 
and other measures.  It also actively promotes transparency of the process and 
recently amended its rues to require arbitrators to write an explained decision if all 
parties jointly request one.  FINRA also ensures where an arbitration panel awards 
damages, the investor will collect the damages promptly. 
Furthermore, in giving investors a choice between arbitration and litigation, 
investors may face a more hostile environment in court, as well as facing significant 
procedural hurdles, in contrast with the equitable principles an arbitration panel can 
employ.  Given the high costs of litigation, firms may decline post-dispute requests 
for arbitration, especially in smaller cases, discouraging customers from pursuing 
claims altogether.  Elimination of mandatory securities arbitration could result in 
higher transaction costs as firms would need to account for higher costs to litigate 
rather than arbitrate.  There is also empirical evidence to show that investors may not 
choose their forum of dispute resolution rationally or even make the choice in their 
best interests.  Eliminating mandatory securities arbitration could also lead to the 
repeal of Rule 12200 of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer 
Disputes79, which allows customers to demand broker-dealers submit to arbitration.  
Optional arbitration would also reduce political pressure on FINRA to ensure the 
fairness of the forum.80 
 
Explained Decisions 
 
On 15 March 15 2005, the NASD filed a proposed rule with the SEC to 
provide written explanations in arbitration awards upon the request of customers, or 
from a request by associated persons involved in industry controversies.  The NASD 
surprisingly admitted that the lack of an explained decision made it ‘all but impossible 
                                                
79 For Rule 12200, see footnote 52 above.  
80 Ibid. 
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[for the judiciary] to determine whether [the panel] acted with manifest disregard of 
the law.’ To date, the SEC has not yet ruled upon FINRA's 2005 proposed rule 
regarding explained decisions. However, given FINRA's recently proposed rule 
amendments requiring an explanatory decision accompanying an order of dismissal 
for a dispositive motion filed before the end of a claimant's case, it is clear that the 
SEC will soon have to address the issue of explained decisions in the context of 
securities arbitrations81.  
 
Non-adherence with Procedures  
 
Many practitioners doubt the fairness of the SRO arbitration process, believing 
that the limited document and information discovery afforded under the NASD 
Customer Code is difficult to obtain due to the securities industry having little respect 
for complying with NASD discovery procedures because they simply do not believe 
that an arbitration panel will be as likely as a sitting judge to sanction them for their 
discovery violations and related behaviour82. 
 
Cost and Complexity  
 
Observers have noted that the NASD Code of Arbitration no longer reflects a 
simple, efficient medium for the economical resolution of securities disputes. Instead 
it exhibits the characteristics of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but without the 
procedural safeguards of full discovery, fair award of costs to the prevailing party, 
explanatory orders, a sitting judge, and appellate review.83 The practice of securities 
arbitration is more contentious than in previous times, arguably due to the lack of 
judicial oversight.  Given the substantial filing fees, pre-hearing and hearing costs 
levied by the NASD – from a pure cost of recovery perspective – litigation has 
become a relative bargain.84  It is not atypical for a four-day arbitration evidentiary 
hearing, coupled with the costs of pre-hearing conferences, to produce fees and 
expense billings from the NASD totalling substantially in excess of US$10,000.  
Factoring in the tendency of arbitration panels to ‘split the baby’, whether it relates to 
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arbitration fees and expenses or to the actual award provided to the ‘successful’ 
claimant, the claimant's net recovery may be reduced to a fraction of what may have 
been awarded in litigation by a judge or a jury strictly adhering to a judge's 
instructions on the law85.  This substantial potential expense stands as both a 
psychological and monetary barrier to the FINRA arbitration forum for many 
defrauded investors.  Although FINRA may waive its fees based on a showing of 
‘hardship’, this waiver is not automatically given and the final determination of 
hardship is customarily not decided prior to incurring the hearing expenses. 
  
Lessons Learnt 
  
Congress requested the United States General Accountability Office (‘GAO’) to 
evaluate SRO arbitration relating to concerns held by Congress, state regulators, and 
investor groups ‘about whether industry-sponsored arbitration is fair to investors’, 
with a primary concern that ‘arbitration at an industry-sponsored forum may have a 
pro-industry bias’. The GAO issued an initial study in 1992 (the 1992 GAO Report) 
finding that there existed no industry bias at industry sponsored forums versus 
independent forums, but made no finding regarding the overall ‘fairness’ of the 
arbitration process due to the limited number of customer disputes being litigated and 
the inherent differences between the litigation and arbitration processes. The 1992 
GAO Report did find that, at the time, the SROs lacked internal controls sufficient to 
reasonably assure that SRO arbitrators were either independent or competent.  In 
particular, the 1992 GAO Report found that the SROs had no formal standards to 
qualify arbitrators, performed no background verification regarding information 
provided by the arbitrators, and had no system to properly train arbitrators to function 
fairly and appropriately.  A subsequent GAO study in 2000 included positive findings 
regarding the SROs’ implementation of the 1992 GAO Report's recommendations 
allowing arbitration parties a greater role in arbitrator selection, verifying arbitrator 
background information, and improving arbitrator training86. 
Securities arbitration has consistently been criticised as favouring the securities 
industry over the interests of investors. The NASD created the Arbitration Policy 
Task Force in 1994 to evaluate and respond to a number of criticisms, including 
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claims that the system was biased or industry dominated. Although the NASD's task 
force found no evidence of bias, a number of its recommendations were designed to 
improve the perceived and actual fairness of the system, leading to rule changes in 
2004 and 2007 including more stringent arbitrator requirements for updating 
disclosures87. 
 
Investor Perception   
 
Empirical evidence shows (1) investors have a far more negative perception of 
securities arbitration than all other participants, (2) investors have a strong negative 
perception of the bias of arbitrators in the securities arbitration forum, and (3) 
investors lack knowledge of the securities arbitration process88.  Gross and Black’s 
2008 study concluded that ‘Despite FINRA's commendable efforts to improve the 
process, these efforts will likely prove unsuccessful in winning customers' confidence 
so long as they are required to accept both an industry arbitrator and an unexplained 
award.’ Among the findings of the study included89: 
- 40.4 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the proposition that their arbitration panel was open-minded. 
- 70.77 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the proposition that they were satisfied with the outcome. 
- 49.13 per cent of the customers who responded either agreed or strongly agreed 
that the arbitration process was too expensive. 
                                                
87 S. Choi, J. E. Fisch and A. C. Pritchard, ‘Attorneys as arbitrators’. 
88 J. I. Gross and B. Black, ‘When perception changes reality: an empirical study of investors' views of 
the fairness of securities arbitration’, J. Disp. Resol., 2 (2008), p. 349. 
89 Ibid.  The findings also included: 
40.58 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition that their arbitration panel was impartial. 
55.48 per cent of the customers who responded either agreed or strongly agreed with the 
proposition that they would be more satisfied if they had an explanation of the award. 
51.55 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition that they would recommend to others that they use arbitration to resolve their securities 
disputes. 
62.62 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition that they, as a whole, feel that the arbitration process was fair. 
49.2 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the 
proposition that arbitration was without bias for all parties. 
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- 60 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the proposition that they have a favourable view of securities for customer 
disputes. 
- 61.3 per cent of the customers who responded either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the proposition that arbitration was fair for all parties. 
However, it has been argued that changes to investor perception of the fairness 
of the FINRA arbitral process may have been caused by the market itself, and the fact 
that in a period of market instability, more awards and damages are likely to go in 
favour of investors than in a period of stability – ironically, what is likely is that in 
light of the 2008 Market Crash, investors will receive larger and more frequent 
awards. Therefore, it is likely that in a follow up survey inquiring about the securities 
arbitration Forum, an investor survey will likely find that the users of the Forum 
believe the present form of the Forum is fair.90 
 
Arbitrator Conflicts of Interest and Bias  
 
Empirical evidence also shows arbitrators who also represent brokerage firms 
or brokers in other arbitrations award significantly less compensation to investor-
claimants than do other arbitrators91. 
 In 1992, the General Accounting Office (1992) published the results of a study 
of arbitration awards during an eighteen-month period in 1989 and 1990. The GAO 
found that claimants received an award of monetary damages in 59 per cent of 
arbitrations and received, on average, 61 per cent of claimed damages.  In 2000, the 
GAO published an updated report that reflected data from 1992 to 1998. That study 
found that investors' win rates had declined to an average of 51 per cent over the time 
period but reasoned that this decline might be the result of an increase in settled 
claims rather than a pro-industry bias.  More recent data indicate that the investor win 
rate has continued to decline. Statistics from FINRA show that investors received an 
award of monetary damages or other nonmonetary relief in 42 per cent of the cases 
decided in 2006 and in 37 per cent in 200792. 
                                                
90 S. D. Grannum, ‘The faith and face of securities arbitration: after the 2008 crash’ in D. E. Robbins 
(ed.), Securities Arbitration in the Market Meltdown Era, (Practising Law Institute: New York, 2009), 
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 There is a long-held view by many practitioners that arbitrators, after finding 
the brokerage firm liable to the investor, are prone to ‘split the baby’ when deciding 
the amount of compensatory damages to be paid by the securities industry in an effort 
to placate the industry arbitrator, and to increase the likelihood that industry 
respondents will not strike arbitrators (public or industry) from serving on future 
arbitration panels. Moreover, there is the view that arbitration panels judge the 
securities industry’s major broker-dealers with greater leniency than their smaller 
broker-dealer brethren.  These perceptions find a statistical foundation by a study 
recently released by Edward S. O'Neal, Ph.D, a former Assistant Finance Professor at 
Wake Forest University's Babcock Graduate School of Management, and investor 
representative Daniel R. Solin, Esq93. 
 The O'Neal-Solin Report also disclosed that the greater the compensatory 
dollar amount requested, or the larger the size of the brokerage firm named as the 
respondent, the smaller the expected recovery percentage for the investor tends to be 
on average. In fact, the larger size of the broker-dealer and the compensatory amount 
claimed can dramatically reduce the likelihood for recovery and the percentage 
amount recovered. 94 
 The arbitration selection process may also be subject to the appearance of bias 
emanating from the mandated industry arbitrator.  Efforts by FINRA to alleviate this 
problem by changing the rules to allow for the option of all-public panels in FINRA 
arbitrations, however, have been met with criticism by industry experts, who cite the 
potential for increased costs due to reliance on an expert witness rather than the 
expertise of an industry panellist95. 
Another characteristic which casts doubt upon the fairness of arbitration is the 
lack of adequate judicial review resulting from the standard of ‘manifest disregard’ 
for the law.  In essence, a party must basically prove arbitrator misconduct in order to 
have the award vacated96. 
 In the context of the perceptions of bias in the arbitral process, it has been 
argued that the inability of investors to effectively enforce property rights through a 
more efficient mechanism, whether it be through litigation, arbitration, binding 
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mediation through a neutral third party, or an administrative law judge, leads to 
market inefficiency, which is detrimental to the health of an economic system. In the 
short run, market inefficiencies benefit only those few who encourage them while in 
the long run they are harmful to the overall economy.97  Often it is the small investor 
bringing his claim in a court of law or arbitral institution that serves as the early 
warning system of wide-spread wrong-doing.  Increased transparency, sensible 
regulation, and the ability of the individual investor to enforce his or her property 
rights in a court of law are important components of any solution to preventing future 
economic instability.98 
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3. Study Results 
 
In order to assess how arbitrators and ombudsmen view the benefits, 
challenges and suggestions for the improvement of both ombuds and arbitration 
processes in the context of consumer financial dispute resolution, a survey was 
conducted between the Fall of 2011 and the Summer of 2012.  Nearly a hundred 
survey questionnaires were distributed to practitioners throughout the world.  A total 
of forty-eight arbitrators and ombuds people from East Asia, North America, Europe, 
the Middle East and Africa responded. The participants represented highly 
experienced practitioners, members of government regulatory ombuds services and 
private arbitration commissions. The majority of those surveyed (44 per cent) had 
worked for institutions involved in consumer financial dispute resolution for more 
than four years. 
 First, in examining the effect of method of practice, whether arbitration or 
ombuds on the relative upward or downward trend in usage, the author finds no 
statistically significant variation between the two methods.  In general, both the use of 
arbitration and ombuds services are on the increase.  Only a slightly higher proportion 
of respondents noted that arbitration was on the decline in comparison with ombuds 
practices.  This finding requires further elaboration as will be examined below. 
  
Table 1: Increase or Decrease in Usage by Method of Practice (%), 2012 
Method Total Response 
Arbitration Ombuds  
Decrease 1 
5.88 
0 
0.00 
1 
4.00 
Increase 16 
94.12 
8 
100.00 
24 
96.00 
Total 17 
100.00 
8 
100.00 
25 
100.00 
Note:  Pearson chi2(1) =   0.4902   Pr = 0.484 
 
 
 Second, the study examined the effect of the method of practice on general 
settlement rate.  Again, no statistically significant variation could be found between 
the two methods and their effect on settlement.  In general, the large majority of 
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settlement rates resulting from arbitration and ombuds processes are greater than 
50%.   That being said, the results indicate a slightly higher overall settlement rate 
through use of the ombuds process.  These findings will be examined more fully on 
the basis of the results of open-ended survey data below. 
 
Table 2: Settlement Rate by Method of Practice (%), 2012 
Method Total Response 
Arbitration Ombuds  
Less than 50% 9 
34.62 
2 
22.22 
11 
30.56 
More than 50% 17 
65.38 
7 
77.78 
25 
69.44 
Total 26 
100.00 
9 
100.00 
36 
100.00 
Note:  Pearson chi2(1) =   0.9365   Pr = 0.626 
 
 
 Finally, the study examined relative user satisfaction by method of practice.  
Again, no statistically significant variation could be found between the two methods.  
A slightly higher level of perceived satisfaction was reported for arbitration practice, 
though this might be largely explained by sample selection bias, given that arbitration 
practitioners are asked to self-report perceived user satisfaction with the process. 
 
Table 3: User Satisfaction by Method of Practice (%), 2012 
Method Total Response 
Arbitration Ombuds  
Unsatisfied 2 
9.52 
3 
33.33 
5 
16.3 
Satisfied 19 
90.48 
6 
66.67 
26 
83.87 
Total 21 
100.00 
9 
100.00 
31 
100.00 
Note:  Pearson chi2(1) =   2.8388   Pr = 0.242 
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A.  Supplemental Survey Results Regarding the Ombuds Process for Consumer 
Financial Dispute Resolution 
 
Supplementing the quantitative survey results, the open ended section of the 
survey identified a number of benefits associated with the ombuds process of 
consumer financial dispute resolution.  Among the benefits include the fact that the 
process constitutes an ‘impartial review service provided free of charge to financial 
customers’.  In addition it helps to ‘improve financial literacy of customer[s]’ and 
‘helps to identify areas of improvement for bank[s].’99 In addition, it provides 
‘parities with a sense of self-determination’ and a ‘platform to be heard.’100  
Avoidance of costly court proceedings was likewise cited as a benefit of the 
process.101  Finally the process is ‘quick, free and confidential.’102 
Perhaps as a result of such benefits, the use of ombuds processes has been 
increasing in recent years.  In response to the question, ‘do you see an increase in the 
use of ombuds services …’ the majority of respondents (89 per cent) indicated that 
they had in fact seen an increase in the use of ombuds processes in consumer financial 
dispute resolution in recent years. 
In examining the results of the survey regarding the rate of settlement in a 
multi-tiered ombuds process, over 87 per cent of respondents observed that settlement 
occurred in 40–100 per cent of cases.  This appears to be a positive rate of settlement 
and provides an indication of the overall effectiveness of the process. 
 
Areas for Improvement 
 
At the same time, those surveyed identified a number of areas in which the 
ombuds processes could be improved in resolving consumer financial disputes.  These 
included ‘increased public information including ‘pamphlets, bank website and 
regulator websites’ as ‘many still don't know about [the] service.’103  In addition, 
                                                
99 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
100 Survey No. 2 (July 2011–March 2012). 
101 Survey No. 3 (July 2011–March 2012). 
102 Survey No. 4 (July 2011–March 2012). 
103 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
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some have suggested the need to cultivate greater ‘business “buy-in” and 
cooperation.’104   
While a number of areas exist for continued improvement in the delivery of 
consumer financial ombuds services, overall, the majority of respondents (62 per 
cent) noted general satisfaction on the part of users with the overall ombuds process.  
 
Suggestions for Further Development 
 
Finally, in response to the question, ‘what suggestions do you have for 
improving the overall process’ of consumer financial dispute resolution, participants 
shared a number of helpful observations.  These included, ‘increased financial literacy 
of consumers on a whole’,105 ‘more “teeth”’ to the process,106 a system of oversight 
by which to “ensure awareness and quality of the interventions”107 and ‘[stat]utory 
requirements to [establish] an ADR system’ in those jurisdictions that do not yet have 
such requirements.108 
 
Summary 
 
Overall, the findings of the survey indicate that practitioners of consumer 
financial dispute resolution view ombuds processes as particularly useful in providing 
an independent and free review service for financial customers.  In particular, the 
ombuds service provides for checks on the system in the form of decisions rendered 
without prejudice to the claimant, thereby permitting the claimant to further pursue 
claims in court.  At the same time the service also helps to identify areas of 
improvement and reform for banks.109 Perhaps as a result of such benefits, the use of 
ombuds processes has been increasing in recent years. The majority of respondents 
(89 per cent) indicated that they had in fact seen an increase in the use of ombuds 
processes in consumer financial dispute resolution in recent years. At the same time, 
                                                
104 Survey No. 3 (July 2011–March 2012). 
105 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
106 Survey No. 3 (July 2011–March 2012). 
107 Survey No. 4 (July 2011–March 2012). 
108 Survey No. 5 (July 2011–March 2012). 
109 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
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practitioners acknowledged areas for continued improvement including the need for 
greater public education,110 oversight and quality assurance of ombuds processes.111  
 
B.  Supplemental Survey Findings Regarding the Arbitration Process 
 
The summary of the findings in relation to the arbitration process are as 
follows: Arbitration practitioners viewed the benefits of arbitration services in 
consumer financial disputes as providing disputants with technical expertise ‘where 
the parties are not arguing over the law, but application of financial/accounting 
principles.’ 112 In addition, respondents noted the ‘speed, reduced expense and 
expertise of the neutral.’ Among the challenges include ‘proof issues, imbalance of 
power and information and lack of full discovery options/rights’.113  Concerns about 
such disparities were echoed by other participants who noted the prevalence of 
perceptions that ‘large institutions have “repeat-user” advantage’.114  Practitioners 
noted suggestions for improvement including the need for ‘[g]ood program design 
[including] exit evaluations [and a] grievance process to allow parties to file 
complaints against neutrals who do not perform well’.  In addition, ‘a code of ethics 
for neutrals’ was suggested along with ‘anything that supports procedural due 
process’.115  
 
Benefits of using an Arbitration Process for Consumer Financial Disputes 
 
Practitioners were asked about what they saw as the benefits of using 
arbitration to resolve consumer financial disputes.  The responses ranged from, 
‘speed; reduced expense; expertise of the neutral’116, to technical expertise, ‘where the 
parties are not arguing over the law, but application of financial/accounting principles, 
it makes sense for the parties to hire a firm… to act as the “judge” (arbitrator) to settle 
the dispute’.117  This view is echoed by other survey respondents who observed that 
                                                
110 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
111 Survey No. 4 (July 2011–March 2012). 
112 Survey No. 8 (July 2011–March 2012). 
113 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
114 Survey No. 14 (July 2011–March 2012). 
115 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
116 Survey No. 7 (July 2011–March 2012). 
117 Survey No. 8 (July 2011–March 2012). 
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the process is ‘more expeditious [because the] resolution [is performed] by neutrals 
who understand finance’.118  Others noted that the process is ‘cost effective’119 in that 
it helps parties to ‘avoid costly litigation, especially in light of the new United States 
Supreme Court decision governing class actions. [It] can offer procedural justice, if 
[a] program is properly designed.’120  Finally, respondents noted that the process 
relies on ‘established, court-tested Rules, and … arbitrators with financial dispute 
experience’.121 
In addition to the direct benefits of the arbitration processes, those involved in 
the delivery of a multi-tier process of arbitration preceded by mediation or negotiation 
noted a number of additional benefits. These include, ‘cost–time saving[s]’,122 
‘bringing about resolution and peace to stakeholders in conflict’,123 ‘give[ing] parties 
[the] opportunity to avoid stress associated with [court] proceedings’124 ‘provid[ing] a 
mechanism for dialogue’125 and ‘keeping friendships between main contractors and 
subcontractors looking forward to working together again on the next project’.126 
In examining the results of the survey regarding the rate of settlement in a 
multi-tiered arbitration process, over 67 per cent of respondents observed that 
settlement occurred in 40–100 per cent of cases.  
 
Challenges in Implementing the use of Arbitration in Consumer Financial 
Disputes 
 
Among the challenges practitioners observed in the use of arbitration to 
resolve consumer financial disputes include difficulties with ‘administration.’127 In 
addition, some have noted limitations in the extent to which ‘bankers have 
incorporated … arbitration clause[s] into their contracts.’128  Others have noted that 
the process involves ‘essentially tough distributive bargaining’ and that often there are 
‘proof issues, imbalance of power and information, lack of full discovery 
                                                
118 Survey No. 13 (July 2011–March 2012). 
119 Survey No. 9 (July 2011–March 2012). 
120 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
121 Survey No. 14 (July 2011-March 2012). 
122 Survey Nos. 15, 21, 22, 24, 25 (July 2011–March 2012). 
123 Survey No. 18 (July 2011–March 2012). 
124 Survey No. 20 (July 2011–March 2012). 
125 Survey No. 23 (July 2011–March 2012). 
126 Survey No. 26 (July 2011–March 2012). 
127 Survey No. 7 (July 2011–March 2012). 
128 Survey No. 9 (July 2011–March 2012). 
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options/rights’.129  Concerns about such disparities were echoed by other participants 
who noted the prevalence of perceptions that ‘large institutions have “repeat-user” 
advantage.’130 In addition, some arbitrators noted that they faced difficulty in 
‘bring[ing] the parties together’.131  In addition, in some cases, there were challenges 
with ‘[i]mpleading … other necessary parties who are not party to the arbitration 
agreement’ alongside ‘reluctance in judicial assistance’ and at times ‘unwarranted 
judicial intervention in the process’.132   
In addition to the direct challenges associated with the arbitration processes, 
those involved in the delivery of a multi-tier process of arbitration preceded by 
mediation or negotiation noted a number of unique challenges.  These include lack of 
‘knowledge of ADR [and] willingness to participate’,133 including the need to educate 
‘people in conflict that there are cost effective and humane alternatives to 
litigation’,134  ‘difficulties in enforcing judgments … (in some settings)’,135 
government cuts in funding136 and assisting parties to come to agreement137 
particularly in the context of ‘lawyers wanting to make fees by taking matters to full 
litigation’.138  
While a number of areas exist for continued improvement in the delivery of 
consumer financial arbitration services, overall, the large majority of practitioners (78 
per cent) perceived that claimants were satisfied overall with the process. 
 
Suggestions for Improving Overall Efficacy of the Arbitration Process in 
Consumer Financial Disputes 
 
Arbitration practitioners were also asked about what suggestions they have for 
improving the overall efficacy of the process.  Suggestions included the need for 
parties to include arbitration provisions in their contracts and the utility of hiring 
                                                
129 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
130 Survey No. 14 (July 2011–March 2012). 
131 Survey No. 11 (July 2011–March 2012). 
132 Survey No. 13 (July 2011–March 2012). 
133 Survey Nos. 15, 23 (July 2011–March 2012). 
134 Survey No. 18 (July 2011–March 2012). 
135 Survey No. 16 (July 2011–March 2012). 
136 Survey Nos. 17, 21, 22 (July 2011–March 2012). 
137 Survey No. 19 (July 2011–March 2012). 
138 Survey No. 24 (July 2011-March 2012). 
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subject-matter specialists including those with expertise in accounting.139 Further, 
‘parties should be more open to the mediation process to try and resolve some, if not 
all, items.’140  In addition, improved training for neutrals was highlighted.  One 
respondent noted the need for ‘[g]ood program design [including] exit evaluations 
[and a] grievance process to allow parties to file complaints against neutrals who do 
not perform well’.  In addition, ‘a code of ethics for neutrals’ was suggested along 
with ‘anything that supports procedural due process’.141  Along these lines, one 
participant noted the need for ‘early and vigorous case- and discovery-
management’.142 A number of individuals suggested more ‘public information’ about 
the arbitration process143 including ‘public educational campaign[s] about the process 
and better judicial cooperation in appropriate cases and non-intervention’.144  
In addition to the specific suggestions associated with the arbitration 
processes, those involved in the delivery of a multi-tier process of arbitration 
preceded by mediation or negotiation noted a number of specific suggestions for 
improving its overall efficacy.  These included greater public ‘education” about the 
process’145, and ‘effort to expedite the process and control costs ... [as] arbitration 
used to be an effective alternative to litigation but now it has also become very 
expensive’.146  In this light, some have suggested a ‘move toward binding 
mediation’.147  Finally, a number of respondents suggested the need for greater 
‘training, workshops and meet-up[s] for neutrals’.148  
                                                
139 See for example, Steven Brams, "Two-Person Cake-Cutting: The Optimal Number of Cuts" (with 
Julius B. Barbanel) 
140 Survey No. 8 (July 2011–March 2012). 
141 Survey No. 10 (July 2011–March 2012). 
142 Survey No. 14 (July 2011–March 2012). 
143 Survey No. 12 (July 2011–March 2012). 
144 Survey No. 13 (July 2011–March 2012). 
145 Survey Nos. 15, 19 (July 2011–March 2012). 
146 Survey No. 16 (July 2011–March 2012). 
147 Survey No. 16 (July 2011–March 2012). 
148 Survey No. 18 (July 2011–March 2012). 
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4.  Conclusion 
 
 Given the small size of the study (n=49), caution must be given to 
overgeneralization and extrapolating beyond the sample group.  Further research will 
be required to extend these findings and offer more comprehensive conclusions.  In 
the immediate term, however, consideration may be given to exploring possible 
applications of ombuds processes in the context of consumer financial dispute 
resolution in the United States. 
 Largely reflecting many of the benefits as well as some of the challenges 
facing consumer financial arbitration, the use of arbitration in resolving consumer 
financial disputes has expanded at a moderate rate.  Recent legislation in the United 
States for example, has sought to limit the obligation to submit to some mandatory 
consumer credit card arbitration schemes.  Overall, the benefits of ombuds process – 
principally, the provision of an independent and free review service for financial 
customers, coupled with an internal check on the system in the form of decisions 
rendered without prejudice on the claimant, provide important safeguards against 
abuse.  At the same time the service also helps to identify areas of improvement and 
reform for banks.149 Perhaps as a result of such benefits, the use of ombuds processes 
has been increasing in recent years. The majority of respondents indicated that they 
had in fact seen an increase in the use of ombuds processes in consumer financial 
dispute resolution in recent years. At the same time, practitioners acknowledged areas 
for continued improvement including the need for greater public education,150 
oversight and quality assurance of ombuds processes.151    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
149 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
150 Survey No. 1 (July 2011–March 2012). 
151 Survey No. 4 (July 2011–March 2012). 
